Cybersecurity for Future Presidents

Lecture 10: DEBATE #1:

Debate 1: Resolved: The U.S. government should mandate that communication and storage technology providers include a mechanism by which protected data can be obtained under lawful court order.

Any Questions?

About previous lecture?

About homework?

About reading?

Homework for next week: Reading, Exercises Reading for next week (for all):

My office hours:

RH

Wed. afternoon, 12-3pm, 442

Exercises: Cryptography and applications

Cybersecurity events from the past week of interest to future (or current) Presidents:

- ✓ Hospital taken offline for a week by ransomware; \$3.6M ransom (9,000BTC)
- ✓ IRS reports 100,000 eFile credentials compromised, PIN guessing identity thieves used 464,000 SSNs in unauthorized attempts to access an e-file PIN and were successful in obtaining a PIN in 101,000 of those attempts ✓ https://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Statement-on-Efiling-PIN
- ✓ DoJ, HSD employee information published, probably social

engineering Coming up: ...? Today's Debate Topic

Debate 1: Resolved: The U.S. government should mandate that communication and storage technology providers include a mechanism by which protected data can be obtained under lawful court order.

Cryptography basics, continued

Key Cryptographic Concepts for Future Presidents

- True random numbers vs. pseudo-random numbers
- Perfect Secrecy, and why it's rarely used
- Symmetric cryptography
- Asymmetric (public key) cryptography - "trapdoor" or "one-way" functions
- Digital signatures
- Significance of length of key
- Man-in-the-middle attacks

Random vs. Pseudo-random numbers

(True) Random numbers - generated by physical phenomena, unpredictable, not repeatable (except if you record and replay)

- Flip a coin, toss a die
- Atmospheric noise: see <u>www.random.org</u>
- Radioactive decay
- Radio noise
- Intel on-chip random number generator:
- thermal noise triggers metastable circuit, output filtered/tested
 Avoid / detect bias: run statistical tests on output
- Looking for a uniform distribution (all outcomes equally likely)
- Transformations can convert uniform to other distributions

Pseudo random numbers

- A string of random numbers that passes statistical tests for randomness, but is generated <u>deterministically</u>
- Computer program with "seed" or "initialization vector" to provide a starting value; eventually, the stream will cycle

How to achieve "perfect" secrecy

- Perfect secrecy = no matter how much plaintext/ciphertext eavesdropper may have, still can't decipher a new message
- Believe it or not, this is achievable: ("one-time pad")
- Requires
 - Key bits must be truly random (i.e., generated by a natural random process, not a computer program)
 - Key must never be re-used* to encrypt another message
 1 bit of key for each bit of message
 - Recipient must have the same key (and must be able to synchronize the key streams)
- Because the key is random, all decryptions are equally likely so
 passive eavesdropper can't determine if proposed decipherment is
 correct or not.
- Also note that an active eavesdropper (one who can manipulate the encrypted bits) can alter the message received (you get secrecy but not integrity)
- See Anderson, Sec. 5.2.2 (p. 132) for more detail
 *Search for 'Venona' for an interesting story of how the Russians misused a one-time pad

Secret Key (Symmetric) Cryptography

- In symmetric cryptography, the same key is used for encryption and decryption as in the 'XOR' examples we have done.
- In effect, the key is a random number that provides the seed for a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG): the output of that generator is XOR ed with the data stream as shown above to generate ciphertext
- The recipient of the message uses the same key to seed the same algorithm, XOR's with the received ciphertext and retrieves the plaintext
- "Key" question: how to get the key to the recipient?
 - Pre-distribute
- Distribute out-of-band (might be paper, CD, memory stick)
- Passive eavesdropper needs to know the algorithm and determine the key to read the message
- Assuming the cryptoalgorithm is strong, then the eavesdropper needs to test alternative keys by "brute force" - try them out
- Key length then determines the strength of the encryption

Public Key (Asymmetric) Cryptography

- The sender and the recipient use different keys one to encrypt and a different one to decrypt (hence asymmetric)
- These schemes rely on the fact that there are "trap-door one-way" functions: functions that are easy to compute in one direction but hard to reverse, unless you know the trap-door
- The most widely used scheme is based on the difficulty of factoring large composite numbers:
 - For two large primes, P and Q, computing N = P*Q is easy But given only N, finding P and Q is <u>hard !</u>
- + Rivest-Shamir-Adlemen (RSA) public key encryption uses this fact
- Keys are generated in pairs, [public key, and secret (private) key]
- Plaintext enciphered with one key (public or private) can only be deciphered using the other one
- Each party can make one key public, so that two people who have never communicated privately can, given each others public keys, create a message that can't be read by anyone who doesn't know the private (secret) key
- However, (relative to symmetric crypto algorithms), encryption/decryption are relatively expensive to compute

Some problems are hard to compute, but easy to check

Can you think of some?

- Finding the square (or cube, or) root of a number
- Sudoku
- Finding the prime factors of a large number
- Traveling salesman problem

It turns out that you can use some of these "one-way" or "trapdoor" functions to provide asymmetric or "public key" encryption

Rivest-Shamir-Adelman Merkle-Diffie-Hellman



How Public-Key cryptography is used

- For exchanging a key for a (much faster) symmetric encryption algorithm that will then be used to encrypt communications over a link. (This is what happens in SSL/TLS to secure web communications)
 - Alice picks a symmetric key, encrypts it under Bob's public key and sends to Bob. Bob decrypts it with his private key. They now have a shared symmetric key
 - Issue: how does Alice get the right public key for Bob?
- For signing messages (digital signature):
 - Alice composes message m, then computes "message digest" a hash of the message, somewhat like a checksum.
 - Alice encrypts the hash with her private key and sends message and hash to $\operatorname{\mathsf{Bob}}$
 - Bob receives message with hash; decrypts the hash using Alice's public key; computes the hash of the message and compares with the decrypted hash from Alice – they should match
 - Can be used for both authentication and integrity

How public key crypto is used on the web

- Public key crypto is a great invention it seems to solve the key distribution problem. All you need is a phonebook of public keys, right?
 Yes, but... whose phonebook do you trust?
- Certificate: data structure used to bind an identity to a public key like the phone book entry
- The phonebook publisher is the Certificate Authority (CA); it has its own public key and signs the phonebook entries using its secret key
- In theory, to get Bob's public key, you communicate with the CA (who
 may ask a higher level CA, etc.) and get back a certificate with Bob's
 public key signed by the chain of CA's who endorse it.
- In practice, Bob is likely to be Amazon or Google and Alice is communicating via her browser. The browser comes with a large number of preconfigured Root CA Certificates (I counted over 200 in my store); it will accept connections that are signed by any of those.
- The "Superfish" adware publicized in 2015 abused the certificate system.
- Certificates normally have <u>expiration</u> dates can be <u>revoked</u> if the holder's private key is exposed

What's a "Man in the Middle" attack, or How Mary Queen of Scots lost her head in 1587



Cipher used by Mary Queen of Scots and Anthony Babington

a b c d e f g h i k l m n o. p q r s t u $0 \ddagger \Lambda # \alpha \Box \theta \infty \overline{o} \chi \not = \nabla S M f \Delta \mathcal{E} C$	x y z 7 8 9
Nulles $ff.$ \neg . d . Doubleth σ	
and for with that if but where as of the from by 2 3 4 4 4 3 \mathcal{I} $\underline{\mathcal{M}}$ $\underline{\mathcal{B}}$ $\underline{\mathcal{K}}$ $\underline{\mathcal{O}}$	
so not when there this in wich is what say me my $\mathcal{F} \times \mathcal{H} \oplus \mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{I} \mathcal{G} \oplus \mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{M}$	wyrt o
send life receave bearer I pray you Mte your name $\uparrow \mathscr{S} \stackrel{\text{free receave bearer I}}{\downarrow} \vdash \vdash \dashv \mathscr{R} \stackrel{\text{free your name}}{\to}$	myne SS

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